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Eight is Enough
Naomi R. Cahn & Jennifer M. Collins*
On January 26, 2009, the nation’s second set of live-born octuplets
was delivered at a California hospital. 1 The public fascination with this
unusual event, however, quickly turned ugly when the media revealed that
the mother was thirty-three year-old Nadya Suleman, who is single,
unemployed, and already caring for six other children under the age of eight.
As Ellen Goodman of the Boston Globe described it, the “mood of the
country has gone from ‘gee whiz’ to ‘are you kidding?’” in a matter of
days.2
The reaction to Nadya Suleman’s new family stands in stark
contrast to the enthusiastic reception many other families with high-order
multiples have received. The cable show “Jon & Kate Plus 8,” for example,
which features a family with a set of sextuplets and a set of twins, is
currently one of cable television’s highest-rated shows.3 The McCaughey
septuplets, born in 1997, celebrate their birthdays each year with reporter
Ann Curry, who has followed the children since their births and does an
annual feature on the family for the Dateline news show. Indeed, the public
fascination with these families dates back at least to the famous Dionne
quintuplets of the 1930s, who were treated as a tourist attraction by the
Canadian government and visited by more than three million people over a
ten year span.4
Now consider the reactions to Nadya Suleman’s story. The director
of the Center for Human Reproduction termed the births a “medical
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1
Remarkably, the doctors were surprised by the arrival of octuplets; they had only been
expecting to deliver seven babies. See CNN, Octuplets’ births surprise California doctors,
Jan. 27, 2009, available at http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/01/26/california.octuplets/
2
Ellen Goodman, We can agree: Octuplets case is just nuts, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 2009.
3
See Susan Stewart, Big Brood Spawns Big Ratings, NY TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009.
4
See CNN, The Dionne Quintuplets: A Depression Era Freak Show, Nov. 19, 1997
(describing how the Canadian government removed the girls from their parents and housed
them at “Quintland,” earning the government and nearby businesses around a half-billion
dollars in profits).

1
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365975

catastrophe.”5 A columnist for the Los Angeles Times called her story
“grotesque” and “bizarre,” and criticized her “manifest irresponsibility.”6 A
San Francisco writer deemed her “misguided and clearly troubled.”7 Even
her own parents have vehemently criticized Suleman, with her father calling
her “absolutely irresponsible” and questioning her mental stability8 and her
mother describing Nadya’s actions as “unconscionable.”9
So what accounts for these different reactions? The cultural
backlash against Suleman has focused on three separate but related issues.
The first set of concerns revolves around Suleman herself, and specifically
her ability to parent fourteen young children successfully. Disclosures about
her background came fast and furious after the children’s birth: she is
single, she is unemployed, she has been receiving disability payments for
several years, at least three of her older children receive SSI payments and
thus appear to have some kind of special needs, and she lives with her
parents in a three bedroom house that may be going into foreclosure.10 Her
defenders see these criticisms against Suleman as mother-blaming. A
second set of concerns revolves around the medical procedures at the
fertility clinic that treated her. How could a fertility clinic agree to implant a
woman under the age of thirty-five with at least six embryos during an in
vitro fertilization (IVF) procedure? The leading fertility industry group
asserts that this was contrary to its recommended guidelines. A final set of
issues concerns more fundamental questions about screening parents. How
could a clinic agree to provide a single woman who already has six children
with treatment that could double the number of children she has? This
particular debate echoes larger cultural concerns over the changing
American family, including calls for two parents (one of each sex) for every
child.
In response to these concerns, commentators and legislators are
calling for new, more restrictive regulation of the fertility industry. Shortly
5

See Judith Graham, Wishes vs. Risky Treatment, CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 5, 2009 (reporting
comments of Dr. Norbert Gleicher).
6
Tim Rutten, The Excesses of Nadya Suleman, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009.
7
Debra Saunders, Dysfuntional Familymaking, SFGATE.COM, Feb. 8, 2009.
8
See The Huffington Post, Octuplet Grandfather to Oprah: I Question her Mental Situation,
posted Feb. 20, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/02/19/octupletgrandfather-to-o_n_168448.html
9
See MSNBC, Octuplets’ Grandmother Criticizes Daughter, Feb. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29098465/.
10
See, e.g., Rutten, supra note 6. Judgments about her race, explicitly acknowledged or not,
may also be a factor.
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after the octuplets were born, Georgia Right to Life helped get legislation
introduced that would limit the number of eggs that could be fertilized in
any IVF cycle to no more than the number that would be transferred into the
woman; in Missouri, legislation was introduced to impose limits on the
number of embryos that could be implanted.11
The debate about whether and how to regulate the fertility industry
is certainly not new.12 But Suleman’s story has thrown two kinds of
proposals into particularly sharp relief. The first set of proposals revolves
around increased regulation of the medical procedures themselves. For
example, some commentators have urged that the United States adopt
mandatory limits on the number of embryos that can be transferred, as some
other countries have done. Although the American Society of Reproductive
Medicine has issued guidelines regarding the appropriate number of
embryos to transfer, adherence is entirely voluntary and, quite obviously,
not universal.13 These issues are difficult and important, and the Suleman
case has begun a conversation about more meaningful regulation of the
medical procedures used by the fertility industry. Indeed, as we develop
further below, we support such initiatives, including more stringent recordkeeping of information related to donors and more meaningful limits on the
number of embryos that may be transferred in any single IVF procedure.14
But we are far more troubled by a second set of proposals arising
out of the Suleman backlash: some commentators have urged the
imposition of restrictions on which individuals may receive fertility
treatment. Margaret Somerville, for example, who founded the McGill
Centre for Medicine, Ethics and Law, argued that we should regulate access
to reproductive technology in the same way that we regulate access to
11
See Ga. S.B. 169 (the “Ethical Treatment of Human Embryos Act”), available at
http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2009_10/pdf/sb169.pdf; Mo. H.B. 810, available at
http://www.house.mo.gov/content.aspx?info=/bills091/bills/hb810.htm (requiring compliance
with ASRM recommendations on implantation). Placing limits on ART procedures can be
part of a "right to life" agenda because of beliefs that embryos are persons and that ART is
morally wrong. Accordingly, arguments for regulating ART risk alignment with an antiabortion agenda, and must be crafted carefully. See, e.g., William Saletan, Crocktuplets
Hijacking the Octuplets Backlah to Restrict IVF, Slate.com (March 5, 2009), available at
http://www.slate.com/id/2212876/pagenum/all/.
12
See, e.g., NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES (2009); DEBORA SPAR, THE BABY
BUSINESS (2006); Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper
Tiger?, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 609 (1997).
13
See Cahn, supra note 12, at 61.
14
We save for another piece, however, detailed answers to many questions in this area,
including issues relating to how to regulate donors and what to do about insurance.
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adoption, and that if a “single woman with six children, living with her
parents, and still studying” would not be permitted to adopt a child, then she
should not be permitted to receive fertility treatments like IVF either.15
Under this theory, women with a certain number of children, or with limited
financial resources, should be precluded from receiving any further fertility
treatment. Somerville also suggests that a patient’s age, and perhaps her
marital status, should be relevant. Some providers have already tried to
impose limitations on the basis of sexual orientation, such as a California
clinic that refused to perform an intrauterine insemination procedure on a
patient involved in a lesbian relationship.16 Indeed, many clinics already say
they would reject patients based on their marital status or sexual
orientation,17 and some states have laws that apply only to the use of
reproductive technology by married couples. Other countries have similarly
imposed such restrictions.18
Issues related to access are also weighty and difficult, but our
conclusion here differs from our position about regulating the medical
procedures themselves: neither fertility clinics nor the state should be in the
business of restricting access to reproductive technology. We do not require
financial litmus tests or impose limits on family size for individuals who are
able to conceive without reproductive technology, and we do not believe

15

See Margaret Somerville, Examining Society’s Role: Adoption gives us a model for the
appropriate use of new reproductive technology, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Feb. 11, 2009.
Somerville is also very concerned about the case of a 60 year-old Canadian woman who just
gave birth to twin boys after traveling to India to receive IVF treatment, using donor eggs and
her husband’s sperm.
16
See, e.g., North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. v. Superior Court; 44 Cal.4th
1145, 189 P.3d 959, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 708 (2008); Joanna Grossman, The California Supreme
Court Rules That Fertility Doctors Must Make Their Services Available to Lesbians, Despite
Religious Objections, Findlaw, Sept. 2, 2008 (discussing case).
17
See Andrea D. Gurmankin, Arthur L. Caplan & Andrea M. Braveman, Screening Practices
and Beliefs of Assisted Reproductive Technology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61
(2005); Judith Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible
Harms, 23 BERK. J. GENDER & JUST. 18, 54 (2008).
18
See Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive
Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1458, 1459 (2008) (describing German and Italian
regulatory schemes); Crystal Liu, Note: Restricting Access to Infertility Services: What is a
Justified Limitation on Reproductive Freedom? The Categorical Exclusion of Single Women
and Same-Sex Couples from Infertility Services and its Role in Defining What Constitutes
Justified and Unjustified Limitations on Reproductive Freedom, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
291, 305-310 (2009) (describing how in Victoria, Australia, from 1984 to 1997, only married
couples could access infertility services).
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that requiring some medical assistance in order to conceive means that
infertile individuals should have to tolerate such restrictions.
***
Perhaps the most difficult question raised by the Suleman case and
other high order births is whether government regulation can be justified at
all in the context of ART. There is a powerful case to be made that the law
should abstain from this area entirely. ART involves extraordinarily
personal social and medical choices and raises critical issues related to
patient autonomy and freedom in matters of reproductive choice. Moreover,
the cultural stigma traditionally associated with infertility may argue for less
public attention to these issues.
Let’s begin with the question of patient autonomy, the idea that
individuals ordinarily have the right to determine for themselves the
appropriate course of any medical treatment that they receive. For example,
doctors may not treat a patient without her consent, and patients have a right
to be informed of the risks and benefits of any procedure before they
undergo it.19 But there have always been limitations to this core principle of
autonomy. Patients do not have a right to receive medical procedures or
medications that the Food and Drug Administration have deemed to be
unsafe,20 and they do not have the right to compel others to undertake risks,
such as submitting to bone marrow transplants, in order to further their own
health agenda. Indeed, federal and state governments have often cited the
need to regulate risk to justify a host of limitations on individual autonomy;
some better-known examples include mandatory vaccinations, speeding
limits, and seatbelt and helmet laws. Autonomy has thus always been
modified by risk, and we believe it is that principle which is relevant in the
ART context.
When a patient undergoes an ART procedure that results in high
order multiples, two sets of health risks are created: one to the mother and
one to the children. Mothers carrying high order multiples face increased
risks of pregnancy complications and even death.21 Children who are part of
a multiple birth are far more likely to be born premature and at a low birth
19

See Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1631-32
(2008) (describing the implications of the principle of patient autonomy).
20
See id. at 1632 (describing how the FDA has “the authority to deny access to drugs and
medical devices found to be unsafe or ineffective”).
21
See id. at 1644 (stating that “some experts estimate that maternal morbidity is seven times
greater in multiple pregnancies than in singleton deliveries and that perinatal mortality rates
are four times higher for twins and six times higher for triplets and higher-order births”).
Men who intend to become fathers through ART do not face comparable medical risks.
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weight. Prematurity and low birth weight are associated with higher risks of
infant death and a host of other impairments, including “cerebral palsy;
vision and hearing problems, and long-term motor, cognitive, behavioral,
social-economic, health and growth problems.”22 Choices about the
appropriate number of embryos to implant are therefore neither necessarily
benign nor neutral – they carry the very real potential for adverse
consequences. Importantly, these adverse consequences are not limited to
the patient herself – her choices also create risk for third parties, the children
who might be born as a result of the pregnancy attempt.23 It is this potential
risk to third parties, against which any potential children are obviously
helpless to defend themselves, which seems to us to outweigh concerns for
patient autonomy and justify at least some minimal government
intervention.
But patient autonomy is the not the only competing value. The
principle of freedom in matters of reproductive choice is also of paramount
concern, and we do not believe that anything we say here should serve as a
basis for retreating from that principle. In this context, however, we believe
that the sort of regulations we endorse below do not impinge upon the core
values undergirding reproductive freedom. At its essence, protecting
women’s reproductive freedom means that women must retain the right to
decide whether or not they want to reproduce.24 Regulating the number of
embryos that may be transferred of course does not compel a woman to
reproduce against her will, so that concern is not implicated, but it may
indeed reduce the likelihood that a woman will successfully be able to
reproduce. This is an important and powerful counter-argument to
regulation; if transferring more embryos increases the chance of a successful
pregnancy, perhaps government regulation should not stand in the way. But
just as autonomy has always been modulated by risk, this particular aspect
22

See id. at 1644.
There are public costs as well, ranging from health care to education. There is a generallyrecognized social obligation to protect children once they come into existence. Of course, the
meaning of “come into existence” is highly contested: Louisiana, for example, has adopted
legislation recognizing that embryos are “persons,” and the proposed legislation in Georgia
accords similar status to embryos. In arguing for the protection of future children, we are not
according personhood to embryos; indeed, if all embryos created in an ART procedure are
not transferred, embryos may need to be donated to another infertile patient, used for medical
research, stored indefinitely, or destroyed.
24
See generally John Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, Choosing Genes, and the Scope of
Reproductive Freedom, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490, 1492 (2008) (arguing that “society is
accustomed to think of reproductive autonomy in constitutional terms as primarily a right not
to reproduce”).
23
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of reproductive freedom has always been modulated by concerns for the
rights and freedom of others. We do not allow individuals to become
parents at any cost; for example, you may quite obviously not appropriate
another person’s child in order to parent or force another woman to serve as
a surrogate. Society has therefore always been willing to draw some line
that it will not cross in furthering any particular individual’s quest to
become a parent.
The key questions here involve protecting an individual’s interest in
becoming a parent25 by ensuring informed consent while simultaneously
protecting society’s interests in healthy children and appropriate market
regulation that, for example assures against power and informational
imbalances. Potential lines that might be drawn involve the number of
embryos to be transferred, the amount of record-keeping on all aspects of
ART, how to ensure informed consent, and measures for keeping the market
safe. We explain why regulation in these areas is appropriate,
notwithstanding the long history of comparatively little oversight of the
fertility industry.
Regulation over reproductive technology by the state and federal
government is limited; the fertility industry self-regulates through nonbinding guidelines and suggestions on ethical practices, and physicians are
subject to various licensing requirements.26 There are numerous possible
reasons for the comparative lack of market oversight, including the tendency
for scientific advances to outpace the law, the limited use of the technology
until the 1980s, and the secrecy and stigma surrounding infertility, making it
not a topic for public discussion. Moreover, reproductive technology taps
into deeply conflicting cultural perspectives on parenthood and other social
issues,27 such as stem cell research, abortion, and sex itself.

25

For discussion of the right not to procreate, see I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the
Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1148-65 (2008); I. Glenn Cohen, The Right
Not to be a Genetic Parent, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 115 (2008).
26
For further discussion, see Cahn, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 12; Naomi Cahn,
Accidental Incest, 32 HARV. J. GENDER & L. 59 (2009). A 1988 Congressional report was
prescient in setting out the issues. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Infertility: Medical and Social Choices (1988), available at:
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/1e/33/
53.pdf.
27
See generally Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close
Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035 (2002) (discussing reasons for lack
of oversight); on cultural conflict, see NAOMI CAHN AND JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V.
BLUE FAMILIES (forthcoming 2010).
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Over the past several decades, the federal government has taken a
few steps towards the regulation of reproductive technology; today, it
oversees clinical laboratory services, drugs and medical devices that are
used in IVF treatments, has established standards for the safety and use of
human tissue such as donor sperm and eggs, and provides monitoring of
fertility clinic success rates.28 Other than through these procedures for
safety, federal law does not regulate the medical procedures involved in
donation. The government also provides some protection from fraudulent
practices, but only in advertising, such as monitoring clinics’ reporting of
their success rates.29 Some states also undertake regulation to varying
degrees.
The reproductive technology industry also engages in selfregulation through organizations such as the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine.30 The industry has developed a series of ethical
guidelines that are not binding, but that contain advice and standards on a
variety of topics that go beyond basic ART medical practice, including
screening issues.31 Although most reproductive endocrinologists follow
these standards, they are not, as the Suleman case so nicely shows, binding.
The occasional “mix-ups” that make their way into newspapers or court
remind consumers and the public of the lack of oversight.32
In contrast, many European countries take a far more restrictive
approach. Their laws are primarily designed to protect the embryos created
as a result of ART – as is the proposed Georgia law. By contrast, our
proposed regulations are justified instead by concern for the infertile patient

28

See The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 (Pub. L. 102-493, 42
U.S.C. 263a-1 et seq.); 21 C.F.R. 1271.1 (2009).
29
See id. The law also required that the government establish a voluntary model program for
states to use in certifying embryo laboratories.
30
See Spar, supra note 12, at 34 (“the threat of regulation hangs heavily over the industry,
prodding suppliers to conform to a fairly rigorous regime of self-regulation and often to act as
if they were anticipating a regulatory response”).
31
ASRM, Considerations of Assisted Reproductive Technologies: ASRM Ethics Committee
Reports and Statements, available at http://www.asrm.org/Media/Ethics/ethicsmain.html.
On screening, see Ethics Comm. of ASRM, Child-rearing Ability and the Provision of
Fertility Services, 82 FERT. & STER. 564 (2004).
32
There have been several reported cases of embryos that were wrongly implanted in the
wrong woman. See Leslie Bender, "To Err Is Human" ART Mix-ups: A Labor-Based,
Relational Proposal, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 443 (2006) (focusing on ART-related mixups).
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herself and her future children as well as protection for the ethical fertility
doctor who does not want to transfer six embryos. 33
If some governmental regulation might be justifiable, numerous
questions arise. What should be the content of any particular regulation?
Why should we go beyond voluntary guidelines promulgated by medical
organizations and adopt mandatory government regulations? What role
should these medical organizations play in drafting and implementing these
regulations? Should legislation be enacted on the state or federal level, and
by what mechanism should it be enforced? A comprehensive answer to
each of these questions is beyond the scope of this short essay and we only
offer some preliminary thoughts.
The Suleman case highlights some of the most pressing areas where
regulation is needed, such as the number of embryos transferred, the need
for standardized informed consent, and the role of insurance. The case also,
somewhat paradoxically, shows one area where we should not regulate: the
question of possible restrictions on access to ART procedures.34
Our discussion here focuses on the embryo issue, one of the most
criticized aspects of the Suleman case. We support limits on the number of
embryos that could be transferred in any single ART procedure. The risks
posed to both patients and future children are simply too great, and the
countervailing pressure for both doctors and patients to achieve a pregnancy
too strong, to go unaddressed. The ASRM guidelines, developed by fertility
practitioners, articulate the parameters of workable guidelines. We also
think that some flexibility needs to be built into any proposed regulation.
For example, imagine that the proposed regulation for younger patients
mirrors the voluntary guideline that is in place now, which states that no
more than two embryos should be transferred into a patient under the age of
35. If a particular 34 year-old woman can establish that due to a repeated
history of unsuccessful attempts or poor embryo quality that she should be
allowed to transfer three embryos on her last ART attempt, then she should
be able to make that case.
This hypothetical patient raises important questions in terms of
procedure. The need to reconcile generally binding guidelines with the
33

A doctor might agree to implant more embryos than recommended because of the
competition between the more than 400 fertility clinics in this country. Stephanie Saul, Birth
of Octuplets Puts Focus on Fertility Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009.
34
Ms. Suleman appears to have used a known donor to create her embryos. There are
complex issues involved in regulating the donor world to assure protection of all involved.
See, e.g., Cahn, Accidental Incest, supra note 26; Naomi Cahn, Towards a Mandatory Donor
Registry, __ DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. __ (forthcoming 2009).
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potential for flexibility suggests that some sort of administrative agency
might ultimately be the best mechanism for regulation. One possibility is an
entity modeled on the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority, a governmental organization governed by a board that includes
representatives from various stakeholding constituencies.35 A second is
Professor Martha Garrison’s suggestion that we look toward a ‘quasi-public
regulatory system,’ like that in place in the organ transplant context . . . .”36
This system could be responsible for reviewing appeals from patients who
believe they warrant an exception from the guidelines. In addition, a federal
agency would ensure that the guidelines are national rather than state-based,
an important consideration because of the ease with which patients could
travel to another jurisdiction to circumvent any unwelcome state restrictions.
Such an agency could also implement enforcement mechanisms targeted
toward the fertility clinics, including measures such as fines and loss of
accreditation.
There are powerful objections to mandatory regulation. As we have
suggested above, we believe the higher risks for both mothers and children
associated with multiple births provide the primary justification for
exploring a new regulatory approach. But it does not necessarily follow that
government regulation is the best approach – perhaps we should instead
respect the traditional sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship and rely
upon physicians to self-regulate or allow states to experiment with different
types of regulation before establishing uniform standards. After all, we have
a healthy tort system to bring medical malpractice claims, and, in addition to
the industry’s own organizations, there are state medical boards that could
potentially sanction their members (indeed, the California medical board is
investigating the physician in the Suleman case).

35

See FAQs about the HFEA, available at
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/en/385.html#How_are_HFEA_Members_appointed.
36
See Garrison, supra note 19, at 1648-1651 (describing the organ transplant approach). A
national transplant network was established in 1984, “to be run by a private, nonprofit entity,
that would maintain regional organ banks and set criteria for donation an receipt of organs.
Since 1986, the nongovernmental United Network for Organ Sharing (“UNOS”) has
contracted with the federal Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to run this
network. The UNOS Board of Directors, composed largely of transplant surgeons,
establishes organ policies, but these policies are not implemented until approved by the HHS
Secretary. Once implemented, however, UNOS policies are binding on local organ
procurement offices.” Id. at 1648-49. Garrison acknowledges the UNOS approach is not
perfect, but it seems to be a possible alternative.
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Ultimately, however, we cannot rely on doctors to self-regulate in
this context – how can a doctor, who has a long history of working with a
patient through repeated unsuccessful attempts at pregnancy, be expected to
resist a desperate plea to implant just one more embryo?37 Further, as
discussed above, interference in the doctor-patient relationship is hardly
unprecedented – doctors are not allowed to prescribe medications that have
not been approved by the FDA, even to patients might be pleading for them,
or enroll patients in medical studies without complying with informed
consent guidelines. Moreover, voluntary guidelines have not worked. The
most recent statistics available, from 2006, show that almost 4% of ART
pregnancies involved triplets or more.38
When procedures are deemed sufficiently risky, government
regulation has intervened in the doctor-patient relationship, and we believe
the risks here are sufficiently great to allow that imposition. That said, we
recognize the critical role of compassion. Infertility is one of the most
difficult life challenges an individual can encounter,39 and we believe we
must do more to facilitate access to treatment. We therefore need to couple
any new regulations with increased insurance coverage for ART. Indeed,
one of the reasons that individuals are willing to gamble by transferring a
large number of embryos is because each individual procedure is so
expensive that a patient may only be able to afford one or at most two
attempts. If patients knew that insurance would cover multiple attempts, the
temptation to gamble on any single attempt would be greatly reduced.
June Carbone and Paige Gottheim suggest another potential
problem with regulation – imposing limits on embryo transfers might cause
us to “lose[] control of the activity altogether” by driving women
underground to black market fertility clinics or overseas to doctors who will

37

Estimates based on government reports are that less than 20% of fertility clinics comply
with the voluntary guidelines on numbers of embryos to be transferred in women under the
age of 35. Stephanie Nano, Few Fertility Clinics Follow Embryo Guidelines, SF GATE, Feb.
21, 2009, available at http://www.sfchronicle.us/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/02/21/MN2A161S2S.DTL. The guidelines do allow for some
flexibility, so this may overstate the lack of compliance. Doctors also face competitive
pressures to report high success rates.
38
See Dept. Health & Human Services, 2006 Assisted Reproductive Technology Success
Rates (2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2006/508PDF/2006ART.pdf.
Interestingly, only 1.9% of births involved triplets or higher orders of multiples, perhaps due
to selective reduction.
39
E.g., David Orentlicher, draft at 12 (permission requested).
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comply with their treatment preferences.40 These are legitimate concerns,
but our proposal to increase insurance coverage will allay many of them.
Most women are not seeking to transfer five embryos because they want
quintuplets; they are transferring five embryos because they want a
successful pregnancy. If women know that multiple attempts with one or
two embryos will be covered by insurance, they will feel less pressed to
travel overseas, for example, so they can gamble with multiple embryos on a
single attempt.41
Another powerful objection to regulation is that once we open the
door to any kind of government interference in fertility treatments, we will
see the door opened to the kinds of restriction on access that are being
suggested in the wake of the Suleman case.42 We do not believe that any
new government regulations should include attempts to restrict access to
fertility treatment by discriminating among potential patients. Clinics
should not screen on the basis of pre-existing family size, the financial
resources a couple has available to care for any children born as a result of
ART, or the marital status or sexual orientation of the patients.43 Individuals
able to conceive without reproductive technology are not subject to these
restrictions before they expand their families. Indeed, we are confident that
any general attempt to impose limits on family size, such as China’s one
child policy, would be greeted with horror by the American public. For
patients who are single or in a same-sex relationship, the state should not be
in the position of barring access to parenthood. There is simply no rational
basis for doing so.44 Virtually all states, for example, allow gay and lesbian
40
See June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies, Regulation, and Trust: Building
Ethical Understandings into the Market for Fertility Services, 9 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST.
509, 518 (2006).
41
Carbone and Gottheim use Great Britain as an example of this phenomenon. Id. at 534.
42
See generally Martha Ertman, What’s Wrong With a Parenthood Market?, 82 N.C. L. REV.
1, 15 (2003) (stating that the “free market aspects of alternative insemination transactions
play a crucial role in making this branch of the parenthood market particularly beneficial to
marginalized groups”). She adds, “I think the private law nature of alternative inseminations,
on balance, furthers human flourishing because statutory regulations would likely reflect
majoritarian bias against single parents and gay people.” Id. at 22.
43
Restrictions based on financial resources or pre-existing family size have recently received
the most attention, but we have also seen calls for restrictions based on age, marital status and
sexual orientation. See, e.g., Somerville, supra note 15.
44
See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health,
957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003); cf. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1
(N.Y. 2006).
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parents to serve as foster parents and to adopt; allowing access to
reproductive technology is entirely comparable.
Commentators might respond that ART is more like adoption than
like natural childbirth and that while restrictions on family size have no
place in the nation’s bedrooms, they do have a place in the nation’s medical
labs and fertility clinics.45 Margaret Somerville, for example, argues that
adoption is the better comparison for ART because “in both cases the
resulting families are deliberately constructed with state assistance, rather
than simply occurring naturally.”46 Similarly, Professor Garrison argues
that the laws on adoption are an “obvious source of policy guidance” for
ART regulation.47
These assumptions are questionable. Most families wrestling in
silence with the challenge of infertility and paying the bills for treatment out
of pocket rather than with the aid of health insurance would surely question
the view that the construction of their family is a state struggle rather than a
purely private one. Further, even families who conceive entirely “naturally”
benefit from the “actions undertaken by health care professionals using
research and facilities paid for with taxpayers’ money” that Somerville
describes as justifying state restrictions on access to ART; they give birth in
hospitals and enjoy the benefits of government research on such matters as
prenatal care and childbirth medications.
More fundamentally, we think families conceived via ART are not,
contrary to Professor Garrison’s argument, truly analogous to adoption.48
Instead, they are much more similar to families conceived without any
physician intervention. ART fundamentally involves medical procedures,
not the social ones that are at issue with adoption.49 Further, adoption
regulations necessarily focus on the best interests of a living child,50 and
45

See Somerville, supra note 15.
Id.
47
Garrison, supra note 19, at 1629-30; see also Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of
Prospective Parenthood: In Pursuit of the Proper Standard for Gatekeeping in Infertility
Clinics, 28 CARD. L. REV. 2283, 2294-85, 2314 (2007) (suggesting that regulation of
reproductive technology might fall between adoption and non-assisted reproduction, and that
clinics might use a preliminary screen for fitness, rather than a more complete best-interest
test). We are more wary than Professor Storrow about “fitness” determinations, given the
dangers (that he recognizes) of the relationship between fitness and eugenics.
48
Cf. Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing? 52 DUKE L.J. 1077 (2003)
(critiquing Professor Garrison’s approach).
49
See Bernstein, supra note 27.
50
We also object to adoption regulations that attempt to preclude single, gay, or lesbian
individuals and couples from adopting. For a map of existing laws, see National Gay &
46
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adoption inherently requires terminating and then reassigning parental
rights, legal steps undertaken only by the state. When evaluating the
optimal residential situation for a living child, the government is in essence
comparing competing alternatives. For example, in the case of a healthy
newborn, there are presumably many families eager and willing to adopt the
newborn, and it seems appropriate to consider whether that child would be
better off going to a family who already has eight children or to a family
who has been unable to have any children at all. In the ART context, we are
obviously talking about potential children, and restrictions on access means
the future children in question will never be born to this family. Moreover,
adoption increasingly involves the wishes of a biological mother, whether it
be for some contact with the child through adoption-with-contact
arrangements or with respect to placement requests. Consider the
involvement of the teen-aged Juno in the 2007 eponymous movie with the
lives of the would-be adoptive parents as an example of the types of
potential relationships. Even when donors are involved in reproductive
technology, that level of participation is literally unheard-of.
***
Ultimately, we need to adopt regulations that support the fertility
industry while also protecting the interests of patients, children, and the
public. Artificial reproductive technology has provided enormous comfort to
people who want children. That doesn’t mean, however, that we should not
prevent doctors and their patients from creating instant families of eight –
plus. The risks to patients and their future children are simply too great to
allow us to continue to rely upon purely voluntary guidelines that have been
demonstrably unsuccessful. At the same time, however, we do not believe
that either the state or individual fertility clinics should be in the business of
deciding which individuals are sufficiently “fit” to receive fertility
treatments. Narrowly tailored regulation must be designed both to prevent
abusive uses of ART procedures that endanger women and future children
and to ensure that patients themselves make the central decision of whether
to parent. Indeed, they are essential for the future of a vibrant and
successful fertility industry and vibrant and healthy families.

Lesbian Taskforce, Adoption Laws in the U.S. (2008), available at
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/adoption_laws_11_08_color.pdf.
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